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See also Newsletter dated 19 April 2013 [doc. web n. 
2304808] 
Processing of biometric data. Preliminary request 
from Unicredit S.p.A. – 31 January 2013 
Record of the action 
n. 37 of 31 January 2013 
THE GUARANTOR FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
PERSONAL DATA 
Having convened today, in the presence of Dr 
Antonello Soro, the President, Dr Augusta Iannini, vice 
president, Dr Giovanna Bianchi Clerici and Professor 
Licia Califano, components, and Dr Giuseppe Busia, 
general secretary; 
Having regard to the legislative decree 30 June 2003, 
n. 196 (Code relating to the protection of personal 
data); 
CONSIDERING the request of the preliminary 
verification of 21 September 2012, presented by 
Unicredit S.p.A. pursuant to art. 17 of the Code and 
regulated by communication of 29 November 2012; 
HAVING EXAMINED the records on file; 
HAVING REGARD TO the observations made by the 
Secretary-General pursuant to art. Regulation No 15 
of the Guarantor. 1/2000; 
REPORTER Dr Antonello Soro; 
FOREWARD 
1. The request made by the company. 
By memorandum of 21 September 2012, Unicredit 
S.p.A., in view of a ‘improvement in the quality of 
delivery of its services,’ said it wanted to make 
available for the benefit (even) of customers a 
subscription service of documents with digital 
signature based on a biometric authentication 
procedure performed by the use of a signpad (called 
‘tablet’), intended to confer, among other things, 
greater security in the performance of operations at 
the counter. The system, as reported, would collect 
behavioural biometric characteristics of the client, by 
detecting and, at the same time, by analysing some 
parameters (rhythm, speed, pressure, acceleration, 
movement) relative to its handwritten signature – 
affixed by means of a hardware device ‘dedicated’ and 
connected via a USB (Universal Serial Bus) to the 
branch office operator’s terminal in charge of them – 
in order to compare them with those previously 
stored during the subscription to the ‘service’ phase. 
Any positive comparison, which would result in user 
authentication, will enable the initiation of the 
procedure of digital signature of the document 
examined by the customer. 
The adoption of such a system, according to the 
company, would allow, amongst other things, ‘to 
develop a series of numerous advantages, also to the 
benefit of customers’, being able to guarantee a 
‘greater security against fraud attempts’ through the 
reduction of ‘risks of identity theft and [of] forgery of 
the signature.’ 
2. Operation of the system and methods of the 
processing of biometric data associated with it. 
2.1. According to a summary of the proposed action, 
the system would operate in the following terms. 
The customer who wishes to join the service, once 
he/she grants his/her informed consent to treatment, 
would be invited, during the enrolment phase, to affix 
6 signatures on the ‘tablet’ for the purposes of 
biometric ‘recognition’; the information collected 
(called a specimen), is acquired by the system in a way 
that is relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purpose of the service and in ‘acritical1’ form – in such 
a way, that is, not to allow, even accidentally, to 
identify that the signatory sufferes a health problem 
from the nature of his signature – would be sent to 
                                                          
1 This means ‘without applying any verification mechanism’. 
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the ‘biometric server’ for the purpose of their 
immediate conversion, through a hashing algorithm, 
into a sequence of characters (‘string’) unchangeable 
and non-reversible into the ‘original’ biometric data. 
After the enrolment phase, on the occasion of the 
signing of documents with a digital signature, the 
customer would be invited to affix his signature on 
the tablet for authentication every time: the biometric 
data thus collected would be compared with those 
previously stored by the system, which would allow 
the initiation of procedures for the use of digital 
signatures only in the case of where the ‘match’ is 
positive. Following biometric authentication, in fact, 
cryptographic keys, owned by In.Te.S.A. S.p.A. (a 
certification authority certified by the Agenzia per 
l’Italia Digitale, previously DigitPA)  kept inside secure 
devices called Hardware Security Module (HSM), 
would be made available for the digital signature of 
the documents viewed by the individual. 
The system, ‘thanks to a self-learning function 
(continuous enrolment),’ would be able to constantly 
update the originally recorded user ‘profile’, so as to 
guarantee the ability to use the service even in the 
event of any changes, in the course of time, of the 
‘style of signature’; in addition, it would be configured 
‘with a minimum acceptance level of signature 
verification (a score) equal to 80% of compliance with 
respect to the template originally created,’ so as to 
ensure, ‘on the point of signature verification (a trade-
off of false positives vs. false negatives) [...] a high 
level of credibility and reliability’, however, could be 
expandable as a result of periodic monitoring and 
verification that the company has declared its 
intention to carry out. 
The biometric data acquired, immediately encrypted 
and indexed with unique codes associated with each 
customer, would be stored on servers located 
variously in the country at the facilities of Unicredit 
S.p.A. and UniCredit Business Integrated Solutions 
S.c.p.a. (a company tasked, on behalf of the former, to 
the management and delivery of information systems 
and related technical infrastructure), designated as 
processor in charge of the treatment under articles 4, 
paragraph 1, lett. g) and 29 of the Code. In addition, 
the same data, without prejudice to the eventual 
withdrawal of consent by the parties concerned and 
the need for further conservation dictated by any 
dispute, would be retained for the duration of the 
service. 
The company, in order to ensure high security 
standards, claimed to have adopted, together with 
the minimum measures listed in annex ‘B’ to the 
Code, ‘any additional security measures, in line with 
the current technical and technological knowledge, 
aimed at achieving the irreversibility of the 
graphometric2 data, the immutability of the same, as 
well as to rule out the risk of corruption and theft’. In 
particular, it is claimed that the biometric data of the 
persons concerned, encrypted using encryption keys 
(in turn encrypted with a digital certificate previously 
produced), are immutable and irreversible; moreover, 
even the communication flows between the various 
‘infrastructure components occur in authenticated 
and encrypted mode,’ while ‘accesses [are] recorded 
in the audit log of the system and made available’ for 
inspection. 
The authentication process, as described, would be 
‘independent and distinct versus the signature 
procedures for the banking provisions and/or 
subscription of contracts’ with the bank. The affixing 
of the signature on the tablet, in fact, would 
constitute ‘the only element that leads to the 
authentication process, resulting in the signing 
process.’ To confirm this, the company stated that the 
‘certification authority [...] is in no way involved in the 
treatment process of the biodynamic data’, the latter 
acting ‘solely in the process of signing documents’ and 
in view of ‘creation and management of the qualified 
certificate and keys for signing.’ 
2.2. The information that the company intends to 
provide to the interested parties prior to the 
enrolment phase ‘will be further and distinct from the 
general information provided to all customers when 
establishing a business relationship with Unicredit’ 
and will explicitly indicate the ‘optional’ character of 
the treatment. The latter, moreover, ‘will be subject 
to the express manifestation of consent by the parties 
concerned [...] and [it will be possible to] revoke it at 
any time.’ The company, moreover, stated that it will 
designate operators of the treatment ‘giving them 
appropriate instructions on the operation of 
instruments and methods of affixing digital signature’, 
stating that it had already taken steps to modify the 
notification of processing operations on 7 June 2012 
(a circumstance verified by the Authority). 
                                                          
2 In Italy, the term ‘graphometric’ is used to describe a signature that 
combines the use of biometry, public key encryption and hashing. 
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2.3. The decision to adopt the system in question, 
according to the applicant company, meets the need, 
among other things, to rigorously identify customers 
during the performance of banking operations, in 
accordance with the obligations provided for that 
purpose by the anti-money laundering legislation 
(Legislative Decree no. n. 231/2007). In addition, the 
use of biometric data – considered appropriate, as 
mentioned, to prevent and hinder fraud associated, 
above all, for identity theft3 – would guarantee the 
signer from further risk of loss of the other tools 
(smart cards, USB tokens, etc.) required for the 
activation of the application process of digitally 
signing documents. 
3. Observations by the Authority. 
3.1. The preliminary application submitted to the 
Authority relates to the processing of biometric data 
for the purposes of authentication in relation to the 
use of a system designed to analyse and compare a 
number of parameters derived when an interested 
party affixes their handwritten signature on a 
predefined device, as part of the procedure for 
digitally signing documents. This measure, which takes 
into account the content of the statements made by 
the applicant company (pursuant to art. 168 of the 
Code) on the difference between the digital signing 
procedure and the authentication, focuses only on 
matters relating to the processing of biometric 
personal data connected to the latter. 
Worth a preliminary mention in this regard is that the 
Article 29 Working Party under art. 29 of Directive 
95/46/EC believes that the use of systems based on 
the use of devices that can detect the signature 
‘dynamic’ features determines, in fact, a treatment of 
behavioural biometrics data, that as such falls in the 
scope of the regulations for the protection of personal 
data (see Working Document on Biometrics of 1 
August 2003, WP 80, cf. further Opinion 3/2012 on 
developments in biometric technologies of 27 April 
2012, WP 193). That said, it is important to assess, in 
this perspective, if the system under the scrutiny of 
the Authority can be assessed as compliant, limited to 
laws regarding the processing of biometric data of 
customers in the authentication phase, with the 
discipline of the Code, with particular reference to 
compliance with the principles of necessity, legality, 
purpose and proportionality (article 3:11, paragraph 
                                                          
3 That is, a thief using the personal information of a victim for the 
purposes of theft. 
1, lett.), b) and d) of Legislative Decree n. 196/2003); 
this, even in the case in which the biometric data is 
collected, as in the present case, only for purposes of 
completion of the enrolment phase and is 
subsequently used (in the form of a numerical code) 
for the operations of comparison in the 
authentication procedure (in topic, see Provv. 23 
January 2008, doc. web n. 1487903; Provv. 26 May 
2011, doc. web n. 1832558; Provv. 4 October 2012, 
doc. web n. 2059743). 
3.2. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
processing of biometric data that the company 
intends to make, based on the documentation 
submitted and the statements made, is lawful. It is 
worth to emphasise, in general terms, that the 
rigorous and reliable identification of customers, 
already required from the banks in the interests of 
sound and prudent risk management (see Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision), is, often, even 
placing an obligation on the part of all the financial 
companies by specific sector regulations (see, for 
example, the Legislative Decree n. 231/2007, over 
which also see Guarantor Opinion of 25 July 2007, doc 
web n. 1431012, more generally, on the obligations 
regarding customer identification, cf. Provv. 27 
October 2005, doc. web n. 1189435 and Provv. 25 
October 2007, bearing ‘Guidelines for processing data 
on the relationship between banks and customers’, 
doc. web n. 1457247) the violation of which, however, 
can be a source of civil liability (see Cass. 16 
December 2009, n. 3350), also assessable on the basis 
of art. 1176, 2nd paragraph, cc (with possible 
relevance, therefore, also of minor negligence: in this 
sense, Trib. Ariano Irpino 2 October 2008, Cass. 30 
January 2006, n. 1865). To this, it must be added that 
the biometric authentication of customers in view of 
the digital signature of the documents would, on the 
one hand, help to effectively counter any attempts of 
fraud and, secondly, streamline and speed up (also for 
the benefit of the same customers) recognition 
operations at the counter. Given, then, that the 
processing of biometric data of the signatories, to the 
extent that it can actually be considered compatible 
with the current regulatory framework applicable to 
services of a digital signature (in this sense, however, 
a first opening to usability of biometric techniques, 
albeit within the wider context for the services of ‘the 
electronic signature’, seems apparent already in the 
‘Guide to the Digital Signature’ prepared by the then 
CNIPA, version 1.3 in April 2009, p. 11, in perspective, 
the ‘Scheme d.P.C.M. under articles 20, paragraph 3, 
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24, paragraph 4, 28, paragraph 3, 32, paragraph 3, 
letter b), 35, paragraph 2, 36, paragraph 2, and 71 of 
the del d. l.gvo 7 March 2005, n. 82’, available at 
www.digitpa.gov.it), will be based on the free consent 
of the parties and to the pursuit of legitimate goals 
made known in advance to the latter ones, it must be 
held that, in the light of what is mentioned above, are 
integrated, with respect to this case, the requirements 
laid down in articles. 11, paragraph 1, lett. a) and b), 
13 and 23 of the Code. 
With regard, then, to the observance of the principles 
of necessity and proportionality (articles 3 and 11, 
paragraph 1, lett. D) of the Code), is to be stressed 
that the system described in the light of the 
statements made, is ordained to capture only the 
information relevant to the purpose of authentication 
of the parties concerned. Also, the service appears 
being configured, based on the information provided, 
to collect a limited amount of information (in this 
sense, cf. template information produced by the 
company), not resulting, however, in the proposed 
system configuration mode – such, according to the 
company, not to allow, under any circumstances, the 
acquisition of information about the health status of 
those concerned – prepared for the acquisition of 
data beyond the scope of those required for 
authentication purposes. 
In terms of security of the data processed, it can be 
assumed that the immediate encryption of the 
biometric information of the interested parties 
(through a key in turn encrypted itself), the use of 
channels for transmitting encrypted data and also the 
use of authentication and access logging constitute 
appropriate measures under articles 31 and following 
of the Code. Also, the fact that the biometric data will 
not reside, not even for limited periods, on the tablet 
(see Project SignPad of 25 June 2012) and the 
template, not reversible in the original biometric data, 
will be stored in a database specifically ‘dedicated’ – 
measures, together with those already mentioned, 
suitable to suggest as remote the risk of any improper 
operations on the biometric data of the interested 
parties – leads to consider the proposed treatment, in 
terms of security, as conforming to the rules of the 
Code. 
Similarly, by reason of the provisions of art. 11, 
paragraph 1, lett. c) of the Code, it must be assessed 
in a positive way the choice to adopt the mechanisms 
of self-learning, suitable to ensure, over time, the 
‘quality’ of biometric data processed. 
Finally, it is noted that the product information in the 
documents submitted by the bank does not have any 
problematic aspects, and it is deemed as law 
compliant that the company, subject to any applicable 
specific standards, retain the biometric data of the 
interested parties for a period of time strictly 
necessary to achieve the purposes for which the same 
data will be collected and further processed (article 
11, paragraph 1, lett. e) of the Code), while remaining 
without prejudice their further retention in the case 
of any dispute, even when also in court. In the event 
of termination of the treatment, of course, the data 
must be deleted immediately or within the necessary 
technical time allowed by the system. 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE GUARANTOR 
pursuant to art. 17 of the Code, at the conclusion of 
the preliminary verification requested by Unicredit 
S.p.A. regarding the use, as part of the subscription 
service of documents with digital signatures, of a 
system for the recognition of biometric characteristics 
of the handwritten signature affixed by the interested 
parties on devices dedicated to it, admits the 
processing of biometric data, provided that it occurs 
only for the stated purpose, with the modalities 
indicated in this application and in due respect of the 
statements from the instant pursuant to art. 168 of 
the Code. 
Under articles 152 of the Code and 10 of the 
legislative decree n. 150/2011, against the present 
provision may be opposed to the ordinary courts, by 
application lodged at the ordinary court of the place 
of residence where the owner of the data, within the 
period of thirty days from the date of communication 
of the measure or sixty days if the applicant resides 
abroad. 









With thanks to Franco Ruggieri for his help with this translation. 
